Resale Externality and the Used Housing Market

The selling prices of used houses may not fully reflect the maintenance spending of current owners when prospective buyers are unable to conduct a thorough inspection before purchase. This article investigates how this resale externality problem affects the maintenance expenditures of homeowners. After considering both observable and unobservable repair expenses, the analysis shows that the resale externality reduces not only maintenance expenditures, but also household mobility. A treatment effects model is used to estimate the simultaneous relationship between mobility and maintenance in the Japanese resale housing market. The results indicate that the resale externality has a significant negative impact on maintenance expenditures.     

Ability transmission,endogenous fertility and educational subsidy

In this study, we attempt to investigate how educational subsidy, childcare allowance and family allowance affect economic growth and income distribution on the basis of simulation models which incorporate intergenerational ability transmission and endogenous fertility. The simulation results show that financial support for higher education can both increase economic growth and reduce income inequality, especially if the abilities of parent and child are closely correlated. In contrast with educational subsidy, raising childcare allowance or family allowance has limited impacts on growth and income inequality.     

Designing the optimal public pension system

This paper uses a two‐period overlapping generations model in order to provide a theoretical design for the optimal public pension system based on a partial equilibrium analysis. Household preferences depend on two periods' consumption and leisure and are positively homogeneous of degree m with respect to consumption in the working and retired periods. We present characteristic features of the optimal public pension system in this paper. First, differences in the population growth rate do not affect the large/small relation between the optimal net lifetime burden rates of generations. Second, we present the optimal public pension system explicitly if m < 1 and m ≠ 0. Third, the difference between the market time‐preference rate and the social time‐preference rate provides a crucial insight into the optimal burden rate of each generation.